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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

R A N D A L L F R A N K MARK,
\
Appellant, J
vs

-

f Case No.

T A M R A J E A N H A N C O C K MARK,
and J A N I S P E C K H A N C O C K ,
\
Respondent. J

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

S T A T E M E N T OF T H E K I N D OF CASE
This is an action commenced by the Appellant to
obtain custody of the minor child of the parties. The
parties had previously been divorced in the State of
Alabama, which Court temporarily deprived both
parties of custody of the minor child and awarded
temporary custody to Respondent's stepmother.
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D I S P O S I T I O N IN L O W E R COURT
The Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt
Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable James S.
S a way a presiding, entered its order which, among other
things, provided that the Respondent, the natural
mother of the minor child, be awarded the permanent
care, custody and control of the minor child of the
parties.

R E L I E F S O U G H T ON A P P E A L
The Respondent seeks to have this Court affirm
the judgment of the District Court.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Respondent accepts the Statement of Facts
set forth in Appellant's Brief on pages 2 and 3 with
the additional facts that are set forth in the Arguments
hereinafter contained in Respondent's Brief.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
T H I S COURT S H O U L D V I E W T H E RECORD I N A L I G H T MOST F A V O R A B L E TO
THE RESPONDENT.
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I n an equitable action such as a child custody case
the U t a h Supreme Court has long held that it will not
overturn the j u d g m e n t of the trial court except where
the trial court's finding is against the clear preponderance of the evidence, Graziano v. Graziano, 7 U . 2d
181, 321 P . 2d 931 (1958), or where the trial court has
committed a clear abuse of discretion, Wilson v. Wilson,
5 U . 2d 79, 84, 296 P . 2d 977 (1956).
This Court has recognized the ability of the trial
court to be better equipped to handle the problems in
equity cases as is presently before the Court. I n Hyde
v. Hyde, 22 U . 2d 429, 454 P . 2d 884 (1960), a case
involving the granting of a divorce and custody of a
minor child, the Court stated at p . 430:
". . . the trial judge, was in a much better position to determine the question of fitness of the
parties to have custody than are we who are limited to the reading of the record. H e had the
advantage of observing the behavior of the
parties and could, therefore, better j u d g e the
emotional stability of each than we can." (See
also, Steiger v. Steiger, 4 U . 2d 273, 293 P . 2d
418 (1956).
The trial court has not abused its discretion in this
case. The Appellant has not proven that he would be
more fit than the natural mother to better take care of
the minor child. The trial court, observing the demeanor
of the parties involved, properly found from the evidence in favor of the natural mother.
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POINT II
T H E D I S T R I C T COURT
PROPERLY
A W A R D E D CUSTODY OF T H E MINOR
C H I L D TO T H E R E S P O N D E N T .
Under U.C.A., Sec. 30-3-10, prior to the 1969
amendment, the natural mother was given the custody
of the children and the husband had an extreme burden
to prove that she was unfit to have them. Though the
degree of burden of proof has been changed when the
statute was amended, the presumption is still retained
"that the mother is best suited to care for young children". U.C.A. Sec. 30-3-10 (Supp. 1971).
The trial court found that the best interests of the
child were to place the child with the mother. The
Court further determined the mother to be a fit and
proper person to be awarded the custody of the child
and that the Appellant had not overcome the statutory
presumption.
In Dearden v. Dearden, 15 U. 2d 105, 388 P . 2d
230 (1964) the Court held that there was a "universally
recognized presumption that it is for the best interests
and welfare of a child of such tender years to be with
her mother". 15 U. 2d at p. 108. The Court further
stated, at p. 108-109:
"The mother's right to custody should not be
denied unless it is shown that she is such an
immoral, incompetent or otherwise improper person that it would be contrary to the child's best
interest and welfare to be in her custody." (See
aslo, White v. White, 29 Utah 2d 148, 506 P . 2d
4
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69 (1973), and Baker v. Baker, 25 Utah 2d 337,
481 P . 2d 672 (1971).
The Court made these statements and it further
stated "that in custody matters the paramount consideration is the welfare of the child". (Dearden, supra,
at p. 106.)
The Court has thus held that awarding the minor
child to the natural mother is in the best interests of
the child, for it is the natural thing to do when all
factors are equal.
The evidence given at the trial court shows the
natural mother to be a good housekeeper (T. 184), as
well as a loving, caring mother for her child. When the
child is not with the mother it is cared for by the mother's stepmother or maternal great grandmother, both
of whom are good housekeepers (T. 129) and are fit
and capable to take care of the child. The child has
been placed in a day care center three times and a few
times with a baby sitter, but in today's society such
actions are commonplace and perfectly acceptable by
all norms of society.
The father of the child must leave the child with
his parents while he is away to school or out on a
"date". If the father's parents were unavailable, it is
easy to assume that the father would also have to leave
the child with a sitter whenever he is unable to be with
the minor child.
The Appellant has been to a psychiatrist on different occasions to discern his abnormalities. While in
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the Air Force the Appellant had his gun taken away
because of his emotional instability (T. 151). The Appellant has made obscene phone calls to the Respondent
while she has been at work (T. 161). The Appellant
has threatened the Respondent (T. 163-65). The Appellant has on numerous occasions refused to give up
custody of the minor child when he knew the child was
to be given to the Respondent (T. 165-66, 173). The
Appellant has done everything in his power to emotionally harm and upset the Respondent. Even the
testimony given by the psychiatrist, who had made his
entire evaluation by meeting the Appellant only once
and for only one hour, when presented with additional
facts as to the Appellant's background and actions,
such as the bizarre and totally abnormal letter writing
(Exhibits 12-D, 16-D, 17-D, 18-D, 19-D and 20-D),
stated that his observations as to the Appellant may not
be correct. The doctor said, upon receiving the additional evidence, "it's an area of less adequate performance than that demonstrated in my office". (T. 154).
Since the evaluation was exteremely brief and without background information, the opinions of the psychiatrist are valuable only to one specific situation
where he observed the Appellant and the minor child.
The evaluation is thus lacking any substantial
value upon which a realistic relationship between the
father and the child can be shown. The father has not,
by his own actions, proven himself to be emotionally
secure or mature enough to handle the life of the minor
child.
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I n the case of Ilytic

(supra > fh

••••'

" I n holding tn.u uw Uh/Uiu ua.^ ui.
*• — 1
proper person to have the care, eustodv and v .-n
trol of the child, the Court did not mean that «1H
was morally unfit. H e simply meant that her
emotional state was such that she eonld not give
that care a?id secuiifv [n ilu *»'Id . .
The lower court, oeing able to j u d g e the emotional
stability and behavior of the parties, found the mother
in this ease to be the better person to take care of the
infant's life. T h e threats and harassments by the A p pellant t o the mother have caused a slight nervousness
in the Respondent, yet the test set forth .?- Hyde
(supra) has not been even partially met by the R e spondent, The mother is emotionally fit and capable of
caring for I lie child. The father's actions warrant close
senf>h\v j . » his emotional stability and maturity
T h e Appellant has not ,n -u,, in.-u the Respondent
is not best suited to care for the minor child. T h e A p pellant did show dial the Respondent knew individuals
who have used drugs, yet so does the Appellant. The
Appellant has failed to overcome H h n g n a g e of
IXC,A. Sec. 30-3-10 / Supp. 1971)
File paramount consideration for :!;*• (/omt *• ,.„
best interests of the child and Uu ti i < • ur t. when
faced with the evidence of Appellant ^ sf range letter
writing, properly concluded that in nrotecting the child,
custody should be placed with -'•• Respondent.
i
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POINT III
T H E D I S T R I C T COURT A C T E D PROPERLY W I T H I N ITS DISCRETION IN DENYN G T H E R E Q U E S T FOR A CUSTODY EVALUATION.
The Appellant would have this Court believe that
in every case wherein there is a contest for custody of
a child of tender years, that the trial court must order
the custody evaluation pursuant to the Family Court
Act, U.C.A. Sec. 30-3-11.1 et. seq.
The Family Court Act was enacted by the Legislature in 1969 and its purpose is set forth in 30-3-11.1
U.C.A. (1953, as amended). Its purpose is stated as
follows:
" I t is the public policy of the State of Utah to
strengthen the family life foundation of our society and reduce the social and economic cost to
the State resulting from broken homes and to
take reasonable measures to preserve marriages,
particularly where minor children are involved.
The purposes of this Act are to protect the rights
of children and to promote the public welfare by
preserving and protecting family life and the institution of matrimony by providing the Courts
with further assistance for family counseling, the
reconciliation of spouses and amicable settlement
of domestic and family controversy."
I t is clear from a reading of this section that the
Family Court Act does not apply in the instant case
where there is not before the Court any attempt to
preserve the marriage between Appellant and Respon-
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dent nor is there any need to preserve and protect the
family life or the institution of matrimony.
The Family Court Act specifically applies where
there is pending before the Court a divorce action which
through the use of counseling and evaluations, the
Court, the parties and their respective counsel can seek
to attempt a reconciliation and thus preserve the marriage.
In the instant case the parties had been divorced
in the State of Alabama prior to the institution of this
action by the Appellant and thus the Family Court
Act would not apply.
The trial court had wide discretion in seeking to
determine what is in the best interest of the minor child
in a case such as the one at bar and within this discretion the Court may or may not require certain things
of the parties before making its determination.
In the instant case the Appellant wanted a stipulated to custody evaluation. The Respondent refused
to stipulate to this and the Court, in respecting this
refusal, denied the custody evaluation and determined
that the Court could, on its own, hear the evidence of
the parties and determine with whom custody of the
child should be placed. There is no statutory law or
case law which would require a trial court to compel
either one or both of the parties to submit to a custody
evaluation in a case wherein the Family Court Act does
not apply.
The Appellant has set forth nothing in his brief
9
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which would show that a trial court abused its descreion
in denying the request for a custody evaluation and
unless there has been a clear abuse of discretion and
determination of the trial court should not be disturbed
on appeal. Wilson v. Wilson (supra), and Graziano v.
Graziano (supra).

P O I N T IV
T H E T R I A L COURT D I D NOT ABUSE
ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR A N E W TRIAL.
The Appellant filed with the trial court on May 6,
1974, a document entitled "Motion for Rehearing" (R.
9). This Motion for Rehearing was considered by the
trial court to be in effect a Motion for a New Trial.
Motions for a New Trial are governed by Rule 59,
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and this rule must be
complied with before a party is entitled to be awarded
a new trial.
The motion which Appellant made appears to be
based upon Rule 59(a) (4), to-wit: "alleged newly
discovered evidence. The trial court concluded that the
newly discovered evidence "was not sufficient evidence
to justify a new trial" (R. 8).
The trial court has very wide discretion in granting or denying motions for a new trial; Uptown Appliance and Radio Company, Inc. v. Flint, 122 U. 298,
249 P . 2d 826 (1952) ; and this discretion will not be
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overturned unless there is a showing of a clear abuse
of discretion on the part of the trial court. Jones Manufacturing Company v. Wilson, 15 U. 2d 210, 390 P . 2d
127 (1964); and Crellin v. Thomas, 122 U. 122, 247 P .
2d 264 (1952).
The Appellant, in his brief, has not set forth any
basis upon which this Court could conclude that the
trial court abused its discretion in denying the Motion
for a New Trial.
The Appellant, in his brief at page 17, engages in
some speculation that because the Respondent and her
companions were arrested at 7:00 a.m. in the morning
this shows Respondent is immoral and that it could be
assumed that she was arrested some time earlier to that.
The Appellant proffered no further evidence to the trial
court in support of its motion other than that the Respondent had been arrested in the company of other
persons. The trial court concluded that this evidence
was not sufficient to overcome the determination of the
Court that the best interests of the child would best be
suited by placing the child with the Respondent. This
decision of the Court is justified in light of the evidence
adduced at the time of the hearing in this matter with
regards to the emotional instability of the Appellant.
There is one other ground upon which the trial
court could have denied the Motion for a New Trial,
and that is Rule 59(c), which requires that a Motion
for a New Trial shall be supported by affidavit when
the grounds include alleged newly discovered evidence.
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There is nothing in the record before this Court which
shows that the Appellant filed with his motion the required affidavit.
CONCLUSION
The Respondent submits that the judgment of the
District Court should be affirmed on the basis that the
Court, after hearing all of the evidence, properly concloded that it would be in the best interests of the minor
child to be placed with his mother, the Respondent
herein.
Further, the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in denying the Appellant's request for a custody evaluation or in denying Appellant's Motion for a New
Trial.
Respectfully submitted,
L A U R E N N. B E A S L E Y
Attorney for Respondent
Suite 430, Judge Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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